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New Economic Analysis of Law:
Beyond Technocracy and Market
Design
Frank Pasquale*
Abstract
This special issue on New Economic Analysis of Law features illuminating syntheses of
social science and law. What would law and economics look like if macroeconomics were
a concern of scholars now focused entirely on microeconomics? Do emerging online
phenomena, such as algorithmic pricing and platform capitalism, promise to perfect
economic theories of market equilibrium, or challenge their foundations? How did
simplified economic models gain ideological power in policy circles, and how can they be
improved or replaced? This issue highlights scholars whose work has made the legal
academy more than an “importer” of ideas from other disciplines—and who have,
instead, shown that rigorous legal analysis is fundamental to understanding economic
affairs.
The essays in this issue should help ensure that policymakers’ turn to new economic
thinking promotes inclusive prosperity. Listokin, Bayern, and Kwak have identified major
aporias in popular applications of law and economics methods. Ranchordás, Stucke, and
Ezrachi have demonstrated that technological fixes, ranging from digital ranking and
rating systems to artificial intelligence-driven personal assistants, are unlikely to improve
matters unless they are wisely regulated. McCluskey and Rahman offer a blueprint for
democratic regulation, which shapes the economy in productive ways and alleviates
structural inequalities. Taken as a whole, this issue of Critical Analysis of Law shows that
legal thinkers are not merely importers of ideas and models from economics, but also
active participants, with a great deal to contribute to social science research.

***
In the film Lost in Translation, actor Bob Harris (played by Bill Murray) travels to Tokyo to
film a commercial for Suntory whiskey.1 After Murray’s first, weak delivery of the ad’s key
line (“For a relaxing time, make it Suntory Time”), the director dramatically interrupts the
filming. Speaking in Japanese, he exhorts Harris to imagine he is at rest in his study. The
director demands that Harris say the line “slowly, with intense feeling,” looking at the
camera like it’s an old friend—like Bogart in Casablanca uttering the classic: “Here’s
looking at you, kid.” Harris, who speaks no Japanese, asks a translator what the director
said. “He wants you to turn, [and] look at the camera,” the translator replies. “That’s all he
*
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Lost in Translation (Focus Features 2003). Of course, the scene is not merely a commentary on an
inadequate translation function, but also a satire of the clueless privilege of an actor lucky enough to be paid
so much for a brief endorsement.
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said?” Bob asks, quizzically. “With intensity,” the translator replies, after a quick
consultation with the frustrated director.
One of the legal academy’s important roles is to act as a translator, taking the best
of social science and developing reasoned arguments about the meaning of such findings
for students, regulators, and judges. Sadly, in the context of law and economics, powerful
voices in the legal academy and key think tanks have all too often engaged with only a
subsection of the relevant scholarship. Like Bob Harris’s hapless translator, unable to
convey the richness of the director’s vision, they offer an impoverished picture of the
current intellectual landscape. Increasingly data-driven and empirical research is presented
at conferences, while casebooks on property, torts, and contracts remain mired in toy
models and simplistic accounts of economic life. Some think tanks present supply and
demand curves as if they settled important issues. The dominant pedagogy and political
advocacy identified with mainstream law and economics needs a paradigm shift, or at least
a shift in focus.2
Over the past few decades, critical legal scholars have assiduously detailed the
problems caused by popularizations of dominant law and economics paradigms. Reza
Dibadj observed in 2003 that “three of the most basic assumptions to the popular law and
economics enterprise—that people are rational, that ability to pay determines value, and
that the common law is efficient—while couched in the metaphors of science, remain
unsubstantiated.”3 In the past fifteen years, conferences run by the American Law &
Economics Association and the Canadian Law & Economics Association, among other
entities, have showcased work that tests (and adds nuance) to such assumptions.
However, in casebooks and classrooms (including ones designed for policymakers and
judges), simplified versions of economic reality persist.
Fortunately, many researchers are now correcting this partial vision of the role of
social science in informing the regulation of commercial life. This special issue on New
Economic Analysis of Law features illuminating syntheses of social science and law. 4
What would law and economics look like if macroeconomics were a primary concern of
scholars now focused entirely on microeconomics? Do emerging online phenomena, such
as algorithmic pricing and platform capitalism, promise to perfect economic theories of
market equilibrium, or challenge their foundations? How did simplified economic models
gain ideological power in policy circles, and how can they be improved or replaced? This
issue highlights scholars whose work has made the legal academy more than an
Similar calls have been directed at economics itself. See Alexander Rosenberg, Economics: Mathematical
Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns? (1992); Alan Jay Levinovitz, The New Astrology, Aeon (Apr. 4,
2016) (https://aeon.co/essays/how-economists-rode-maths-to-become-our-era-s-astrologers).
2

Reza Dibadj, Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case for Critical Legal Economics,
2003 Utah L. Rev. 1155.
3

The term “new economic thinking” owes some currency to the success of the Institute for New Economic
Thinking (INET) in updating and improving economic discourse.
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“importer” of ideas from other disciplines—and who have, instead, shown that rigorous
legal analysis is fundamental to understanding economic affairs.
This issue of Critical Analysis of Law features leading scholars who have corrected
for various shortcomings in the mainstream of legal economic pedagogy and policy
analysis. Professors Bayern, Kwak, and Listokin offer creative critiques of mainstream
paradigms. In terms familiar from the philosophy of social science, they complement
parsimony and methodological individualism with a recognition of the importance of
scope and holism. There are now many computational efforts to use big data and
predictive analytics to rehabilitate old paradigms of rational consumers and efficient
markets; Professors Ranchordás, Stucke, and Ezrachi show that the digital world may be
susceptible to even more extreme distortion than the types of “real-space” transactions it
is rapidly displacing. Finally, Professors McCluskey and Rahman offer an alternative to
mainstream law and economics: a political economy perspective which emphasizes the
role of legal rules in shaping and even determining economic realities. This introduction
describes their contributions.
I. Failures of the Mainstream
Numerous movements have criticized the mainstream economics curriculum taught at
most large universities in the United States, Canada, and United Kingdom. For example,
students at Harvard protested Professor N. Gregory Mankiw’s course (colloquially called
Ec 10) for biased presentation of a particular ideology as unquestionable economic reality.
There was a citywide, student-led effort to “demystify, diversify, and invigorate”
economics in New York City in 2014.5 Numerous organizations have also criticized
mainstream orthodoxies about topics ranging from trade policy to government deficit
spending. Core-Econ has produced a new casebook on the economics of inequality,
sustainability, and innovation. Dozens of books written in the wake of the Global
Financial Crisis of 2008 raised fundamental questions about the nature of economic
analysis, and whether it was fit for purpose in an era of extraordinary power inequalities,
systemic risk in finance, and dangerous climate change.
James Kwak’s 2017 book, Economism, was a notable addition to this literature,
since it so clearly and compellingly showed how failures of mainstream economics
undermined the well-being of ordinary consumers and citizens.6 Kwak defines
economism as a misguided belief that simple concepts from introductory economics
courses explain and describe commercial life so well that they should provide models for
reasoning about all policy decisions. For example, consider the role of economics in
health care policy. A simple supply and demand model would predict that licensure
Anisha Datta, Columbia Students Help Organize City-Wide Economics Conference, Columbia Spectator
(Sept. 14, 2014) (http://spc.columbiaspectator.com/news/2014/09/14/columbia-students-help-organizecity-wide-economics-conference).
5
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requirements would suppress the supply of health care professionals (like doctors and
nurses). So economists like Milton Friedman counseled policymakers to review such
requirements with a gimlet eye. Relaxing them could increase the supply of doctors,
thereby reducing the price of care, so that it is more accessible. Of course, such a policy
move could also reduce the quality of the care provided: it would permit some unqualified
practitioners to enter the field. But assessing the quality of health care is hard—it requires
data on the structure, process, and/or outcomes of care provided. It is much easier to
simply focus on classic supply and demand curves, mesmerizingly simple depictions of
actions and reactions upon price and quantity.
Economism all too often entails failures of scope, in the name of parsimonious
theory. To fairly assess health policy, we need to think clearly about quality. Like
scientism, economism also tends to assume that further simple concepts can solve
whatever shortcomings arise out of a supply and demand framework. So, in our medical
example, the hope is that patients will carefully review the quality of their doctor’s or hospital’s
work.
Of course, the problem of credence goods undermines economism’s simple
narratives about markets. It is very hard for someone without a medical degree to assess
whether his or her doctor has actually lived up to the standard of care in any given
situation. And there are other discontinuities between the medical market, such as it is,
and other markets for goods and services. A bad meal may be unpleasant, but a bad
surgery can be life-threatening.
In his contribution to this symposium, Kwak explores how lawyers and law
professors have recapitulated the errors of the popularizers of economics, plying “just-so”
stories while ignoring evidence contrary to their points of view. Richard Posner, for
instance, said that a progressive tax would reduce risk-taking; Kwak shows that there was
readily available counter-evidence even at the time Posner was doing his pioneering work.
Sadly, this is not an isolated error, nor one Posner eventually stopped making. He has,
more recently, ignored obvious evidence on how inequality harms society.7 At a
conference last year, he expressed exasperation at recent efforts to apply antitrust law to
Google. 8 When I asked him if any articles or books written from 2007 to 2017 influenced
his position on this dimension of digital antitrust, he replied “No—I have judged entirely
from my use of Google.”9 Economism means never having to be sorry you failed to read
key literature.

Frank Pasquale, Fisking Posner on Inequality, Concurring Opinions
(https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/12/fisking_posner.html).
7

(Dec.

16,

2006)

Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, Is There a Concentration Problem in America?,
Mar. 27-29, 2017 (https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/events/single-events/march-27-2017).
8

Stigler Center, Judge Richard A. Posner in Conversation with Professor Luigi Zingales, YouTube (Mar. 30,
2017) (https://youtu.be/JRCm_gJ2EOk?t=38m54s).
9
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Shawn Bayern shares Kwak’s concern about the scope of economic analysis, as
well as the partial ways in which it tends to comprehend litigation or transactions. He
finds that law and economics scholars will often seize upon one consideration in a
scenario as very important to the proper resolution of a dispute, while downplaying other,
equally important considerations. For instance, Posner and Rosenfield purport to apply
economics to the vexing problem of resolving contract disputes when unexpected
changes in circumstances occur.10 For Posner and Rosenfield, courts should carefully
consider which party to litigation could have prevented or insured against such risks more
cheaply than the other, and then, as “an aid to interpretation,”11 read the contract as if it
assigned this duty to the least-cost-avoider. Of course, that principle immediately runs
into difficulties with respect to its scope and force: what if very poor people are very
frequently least-cost-avoiders, because the marginal product of their labor is so low that
their spending days to prepare for changes in circumstances is less “costly” than betterpaid counterparties’ diversion of effort to such tasks? What if the least-cost-avoider has
lower costs of preparation that are only an infinitesimal fraction of the amount in dispute?
In neither case would it seem fair or wise to spend much time at all considering who is the
least-cost-avoider as a guiding principle in the case.
Bayern suggests even more problems with the least-cost-avoider principle here,
including issues of administrability. But his primary challenge is more fundamental.
Contract law is not primarily about making transactions maximally efficient. It is about
respecting the preferences of the contractors, consistent with any number of other
societal goals that may statutorily or via common law restrict the prerogatives of
contracting parties. That requires courts to examine the entire situation of the contract,
rather than engaging in premature heuristic shortcuts like the one proposed by Posner and
Rosenfield.
Similarly, much of law and economics’ touted parsimony may be due to simply
running roughshod over rival ways of conceptualizing a dispute. Bayern reconsiders the
problem of a land buyer who “develops a well-informed hunch that a particular block of
farmland may have serious potential as a mineral reserve or an oil-drilling site, and does
not disclose this fact to the incumbent farmer before purchasing the land at a price that
reflects only agricultural uses.”12 Michael J. Trebilcock presents the issue from both
utilitarian and deontological perspectives, richly describing an array of moral and
economic considerations that should inform legal determinations here. By contrast,
mainstream law and economics has focused on how the legal system can incentivize and
reward the production of information. Since requiring disclosure would reduce the
incentive to gather the information in the first place, the mainstream reasoning goes, the
Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. Legal Stud. 83 (1977).
10

11

Id. at 90.
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Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract 107-08 (1993).
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buyer should not be under an obligation to disclose it before purchase. Bayern
demonstrates that, even if we assume that narrow goal, there are many ways to achieve it
other than by endorsing a legal rule that the buyer is under no obligation to disclose his or
her research before buying the plot of land.
Moreover, there are many other considerations that should enter the analysis here.
What are the effects on trust levels in a society once other landowners learn that they
missed an opportunity?13 Given what we now know about climate change, it is more than
evident that any valuation of oil here must include not only a market price, but a full
social accounting of the damage caused by greenhouse gases.14 For mainstream legal
economists, that may seem an inappropriately imponderable aspect of the problem to
feature in ordinary legal reasoning. The siren song of parsimony counsels against its
consideration. However, simplification of legal rules and predictability are only two of the
many goals of a legal system. Even if wise judges were to decide that climate effects of
carbon extraction were too remote to be fairly considered in a case concerning duties to
disclose research on land value, the very fact that such a decision should be made (one
way or another), suggests the limits of any simple focus on one facet of the problem. 15
Yair Listokin’s article in this issue acutely marks this partiality by demonstrating
that mainstream law and economics has systematically downplayed the importance of an
entire branch of economics—macroeconomics—for decades. By focusing on dyadic
interactions between plaintiffs and defendants, the doctrine has failed to take into account
the ways in which incentives at the micro-level can lead to unexpected effects at the
societal level.
John Maynard Keynes offered a classic example of this kind of reasoning when he
analyzed the simultaneous individual rationality, and collective irrationality, of individuals
saving money during a depression. Keynes recognized the “paradox of thrift” in the early
twentieth century, and it is a counter-narrative to the usual technocratic story of virtuous
austerity.16 Spending cuts play into the liquidationist illogic of the Ourobouros: those who
benefit in their role as consumers end up losing out as producers. Governments may save
budget expenditures by slashing spending, but then undercut the future economic activity
that generates taxes.17 Austerity threatens to condemn struggling economies to a
13

Stephen Marglin, The Dismal Science: How Thinking Like an Economist Undermines Community (2008).

Nicholas
Stern,
Stern
Review:
The
Economics
of
Climate
Change
(2006)
(http://mudancasclimaticas.cptec.inpe.br/~rmclima/pdfs/destaques/sternreview_report_complete.pdf).
14

Ironically, perhaps only certain very strong versions of natural law theory could support an idea of the
pursuit of knowledge as a trump card. Consider, for instance, Finnis’s designation of knowledge as an
intrinsic good in Natural Law and Natural Rights.
15

On the importance of counternarrative, see Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 309 (2016).
16

A similar problem can occur when vast sums of money in an economy accumulate in, and only circulate
between members of, a tiny elite. Frank Pasquale, Closed-Circuit Economics, Concurring Opinions (Nov.
26, 2010) (https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/11/closed-circuit-economics.html); Frank
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downward spiral of deflation: lower prices, lower pay, and consequent unwillingness of
consumers to spend even on low-priced goods—leading to even cheaper prices, and a
reinforcement of the same disastrous dynamic.18 From the United States in the 1930s to
the Japan of the 2000s, this paradox of thrift has afflicted real economies. And it is clearly
one of the biggest problems arising out of a future of mass automation, where tens of
millions of workers may be replaced by machines. A retailer may be thrilled to see selfdriving cars break a taxi drivers’ union (anticipating lower ride costs)—only to find that
drivers no longer have the money to shop at his store. Moreover, as I pointed out in a
discussion of “health care macroeconomics” in 2014, microeconomic experts intent on
cutting health care costs may ultimately undermine larger societal goals of growth and
inclusion.19 They can be penny wise, but pound foolish. Understandably focused on shortterm cost reduction, they miss opportunities for long-term investment in healthier
populations, meaningful work, and medical innovation.
The genius of Keynes’s “paradox of thrift” is that it so clearly encapsulates a story
about the economy counter to our usual way of thinking. The conventional wisdom is
that a poor country has to “live within its means”—but maybe efforts to cut back will
only harm their intended beneficiaries. Listokin follows in this tradition by arguing that
context matters in legal-economic determination—particularly, whether they are being
made in a time of deep recession (when interest rates are near zero and unemployment is
high). A more demanding standard of care in such times may fruitfully incentivize firms
and individuals to do the type of investment that will otherwise be neglected in lean times.
Left unchecked by the state, that neglect would, in turn, feed back into the very economic
conditions that caused it, leading to a vicious circle. Listokin creatively applies Keynesian
thinking here in order to demonstrate that the judiciary can join the legislative and
executive branches to fight unemployment and other forms of economic stagnation.
II. Questioning the Computationalist Project in Contemporary Law and
Economics
Kwak, Bayern, and Listokin identify deep problems in popular law and economics that
can all too often seem blinkered, partial, and simplistic. Perhaps recognizing such
infirmities, some leading scholars in law and economics have begun to turn to big data,
algorithms, and other technological advances in order to rescue paradigms of efficient
markets and rational consumers. But several contributors to this issue question whether
technology is a panacea for unequal power relations and sharp dealing by powerful market
Pasquale, Capital’s Offense, Boundary2 (Oct. 1, 2014) (https://www.boundary2.org/2014/10/capitalsoffense-laws-entrenchment-of-inequality) (reviewing Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century
(2014)).
Frank Pasquale, Dystopia Is to Apocalypse as Deflation Is to Hyperinflation, Concurring Opinions (Dec.
21, 2008) (https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/12/dystopia_apocal.html).
18
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Frank Pasquale, The Hidden Costs of Health Care Cost Cutting, 77 Law & Contemp. Probs. 171 (2014).
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participants. They show that increases in the amount of information available about
products, services, firms, and consumers are not necessarily good in themselves. Rather,
who controls this information, and how they use such control, matters vitally to both the
efficiency and fairness of markets.
Information is critical to market design.20 In some models, “perfect information”
can be a theoretical precondition for the efficient functioning of a market. Less heroically,
rules of reporting and disclosure are supposed to help consumers understand the relative
value of a good or service. Persistent surveillance of transactions (and many other
dimensions of life) promises a wealth of information to guide both businesses and
policymakers.21 We see this daily online with the personalization of advertising and
content, which has been optimized for our “data double”—some spectral ensemble of
past recorded actions that predicts a positive response (such as continued viewing, or
clicking an ad) from the stimulus provided.22
Just as physicians advance personalized medicine to better cure diseases,
advocates of personalized law believe that the high technology tailoring that has been a
hallmark of digital behemoths (such as Amazon, Apple, Google, and Facebook) can apply
to regulation. 23 Many of Kwak’s, Bayern’s, and Listokin’s concerns focus on failures of
scope in law and economics—how the right decision in one stylized situation, at one
given time, would not be efficient in many others (Kwak and Bayern), or even the same
one at a different time (Listokin). Personalized law aspires to avoid unfairly or inefficiently
lumping together dissimilar persons or entities. 24 Advocates of this approach, including
Omri Ben-Shahar, Ariel Porat, Lior J. Strahilevitz, Anthony J. Casey, Philipp Hacker, and
Anthony Niblett, have developed bold, big-data-driven proposals for more precise
categories aimed at optimal law enforcement.25 Such personalization aims to permit
governments to fine-tune regulation to enhance the granularity of legal norms.
Administrability concerns have hampered the application of dynamically tailored legal

Philip Mirowski & Edward Nik-Khah, The Knowledge We Have Lost in Information: The History of
Information in Modern Economics (2017).
20

Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 Md. L. Rev.
682 (2013).
21

Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New
Frontier of Power (forthcoming 2018).
22

A draft of this and the next few paragraphs were composed with Julia Powles, for a proposal we plan to
pursue in future work.
23

24

Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 655 (2014).

Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 Ind. L.J. 1401 (2017); Ariel
Porat & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich. L. Rev.
1417 (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 627 (2016);
Phillip Hacker, Personalizing EU Private Law: From Disclosures to Nudges and Mandates, 25 Eur. Rev.
Priv. L. 651 (2017).
25

Pasquale — New Economic Analysis of Law

9

categories, including even the targeting of nudges. 26 Big-data-driven approaches are, it is
projected, a way to solve these concerns.
Personalized law is an offshoot of behavioral economics and law,27 powered by
large-scale personal data capture.28 However, personalized law will only be as good as the
data it is based upon. One of the principal challenges for big data approaches is that data
sources are prone to inaccuracy. As Rob Kitchin has argued in The Data Revolution, there
are often inaccuracies in databases that can undermine even well-intentioned personalizers.29
Sofia Ranchordás exposes many potential problems with a key source of
information for those legal economists who would use rankings and ratings to substitute
for (or even inform) legal determinations. Her deeply researched perspective on the role
of reputation in market transactions roots current debates about online rating and ranking
sites in categories and models developed decades ago. She canvasses a great deal of
empirical research to weigh the costs and benefits of reputational mechanisms. She raises
deep concerns about their objectivity and vulnerability to manipulation.
Ranchordás’s results are in accord with more general problems in information
markets. Many firms have an interest in manipulating data, and policymakers have not
adequately monitored the types of high technology firms that provide information to
consumers or businesses on a mass scale, in vital contexts. 30 The market in personal
information offers little incentive for high levels of accuracy.31 It matters little to
purchasers of lists containing detailed personal information whether every entry is
accurate—they need only a certain threshold percentage of “hits” across the population to
make a measurable improvement in targeting. 32 But to individuals wrongly included on
derogatory lists, the harm to their reputation and opportunities is great.33
Both government classification processes, and the data they rely upon, need to be
improved if they are to realize the promise of personalized law. In the governmental
realm, enhanced due process protections are needed for victims of suspect
See, e.g., Shawn J. Bayern & Melvin E. Eisenberg, The Expectation Measure and its Discontents, 2013
Mich. St. L. Rev. 1.
26

Avishalom Tor, The Next Generation of Behavioral Law and Economics, in European Perspectives on
Behavioral Law and Economics 17 (Klaus Mathis ed., 2015).
27

Philipp Hacker & Bilyana Petkova, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, and
New Regulatory Frontiers, 15 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1 (2017); Philipp Hacker, Overcoming the
Knowledge Problem—Uncertainty, Decision Theory, and Maximin Analysis (Apr. 21, 2017)
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2632022).
28

29

Rob Kitchin, The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures and Their Consequences (2014).

30

Mark Patterson, Antitrust Law in the New Economy (2017).

Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation: Disclosure and the Challenge of Clandestinely Commensurating
Computing, in The Offensive Internet: Privacy, Speech, and Reputation 107 (Saul Levmore & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., 2010).
31

32

Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (2015).

33

Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 Loyola L. Rev. 515 (2016).
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personalization. Ranchordás also demonstrates that European regulators are taking
important steps to rectify this problem, by advancing transparency. Both the UK
Competition & Market Authority and the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets
have called the issue a serious problem.
During the Bush and Obama administrations, United States regulators also took
the problem seriously, requiring disclosures from sponsored reviews and other
manipulations of the information environment. Precedents set then remain the law today.
However, there is a great danger that the Trump Administration will embrace online
ratings and rankings not merely as a source of information, but as a replacement for
licensing and regulatory regimes. Who needs to know if their plumber has a license, so the
logic goes, if the plumber has many five star reviews online? The Trump Federal Trade
Commission’s Economic Liberty Task Force has eyed such a transition (from licensure to
online status) as a way to end many occupations’ licensing, displacing extant legal
structures. According to the usual economic logic, such tiered rating (rather than all-ornothing licensure) of workers would expand access to employment and services. Rather
than having “no plumber at all,” so the logic goes, the poor could now afford to hire a 1star or 2-star rated plumber who, while not licensed, could at least perform basic work.
However, as Ranchordás shows, this perspective ignores the serious limitations of
these reputational systems, especially in the context of products and services with
externalities. Widespread reliance on reputational screening without funding extensive
monitoring and regulation of such screening is an open invitation to abuse, as Google
found recently when fraudulent addiction rehabilitation centers started hijacking its “usergenerated” rankings in location searches. Policymakers should take Ranchordás’s
recommendations very seriously, since it is easy to game rating and ranking systems.
Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke take on a related problem in the new digital
economy: how new digital assistants can manipulate those who use them. There is an
enormous and growing literature in “critical algorithm studies,” which examines the biases
encoded in algorithms, training data, and other critical components of computational or
quantitative evaluation.34 Thanks to the movement for algorithmic accountability
(#algacc), we know that algorithmic corporate decisionmaking is frequently deployed to
arbitrage around extant anti-discrimination, due process, and media law. Stucke and
Ezrachi have demonstrated its import for both consumer protection law and competition law.
In their notable book, Virtual Competition, Stucke and Ezrachi demonstrated that a)
no intent to evade competition law needs to exist among top executives for their firms’
algorithmic pricing strategies to, nevertheless, eviscerate its purposes and policy goals, and
b) such algorithmic arrangements of information endanger the very foundations of market

Tarleton Gillespie & Nick Seaver, Critical Algorithm Studies: A Reading List, SMC Research Blog
(updated Dec. 16, 2016) (https://socialmediacollective.org/reading-lists/critical-algorithm-studies/).
34
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competition.35 Computational power endangers the legitimacy of “free market capitalism”
by concentrating the very information that market stalwarts like Friedrich von Hayek
claimed was naturally decentralized and unavailable to any single firm. The extreme
centralization of knowledge in firms like Google, Amazon, and Facebook could lead to a
“planned economy,” albeit one planned by CEOs, not government bureaucrats. Critics of
data brokers have also noted the extreme vulnerability of consumers in an era where the
firms hide their full data troves from regulators, while sharing them among one another.
In their essay “Alexa et al., What Are You Doing With My Data?,” Stucke and
Ezrachi raise fascinating questions about what rational consumers, or efficient markets,
will look like in a plausible world in which individuals outsource more of their decisions
to digital assistants like Amazon’s Alexa, Google Home, Apple’s Siri, or others. As faithful
agents of consumer interests, they might be expected to find consumers ever cheaper
flights, better routes to get to work, more affordable insurance or groceries. But is that
trust really warranted? As mentioned above, Google’s search results disserved many
addicts in search of a reputable rehab center. The commercial relationships between
Amazon and many of its suppliers are opaque, leading some critics to question whether
the tens of millions of American citizens who are now Amazon Prime subscribers are
actually obtaining optimal deals, or are, instead, being shaped into customers who best
serve the long term interests of the company. For example, once Amazon decided to
make a big move into groceries (via Amazon Fresh), it aggressively steered some
customers ordering food toward Amazon Fresh options (which are nearer, but with
deliveries that come with a $15 per month subscription fee). Amazon Fresh features low
prices now, but it is by no means clear it will continue to do so if it is able to decimate
local grocery stores. Indeed, a study on price discrimination has shown that one store
(Staples) tended to raise prices for those digital consumers whom its algorithms calculated
did not live near an office supply store.
Nor are such power plays rare among the most important digital platforms. The
European Commission demonstrated that Google prioritized its “Google Shopping”
service above smaller price-comparison services like Foundem, devastating fledgling
firms.36 While the European Union has fined that behavior as anti-competitive, regulators
are ill-equipped to monitor the myriad ways that platforms can subtly nudge consumers
toward one choice, and away from others. Thanks to a combination of cognitive capture
and the soft corruption of the revolving door, relevant authorities have not required
regulatory access to the key information, and have not invested in the resources they
would parse it properly. This problem will only get worse in an era of digital assistants,
Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven
Economy (2016).
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when many recommendations will be ephemerally “voiced” rather than registered as text
on websites or mobile screens.
When a firm can gather and continually analyze thousands of data points about
any given consumer, and adjust its offerings and advertising in real time, the standard
issue, arms-length relationship between buyer and seller modeled in basic economics
textbooks becomes woefully inadequate. As Stacy Mitchell of the Institute for Local SelfReliance recently observed, “[W]hen third-party sellers post new products, Amazon tracks
the transactions and then starts selling many of their most popular products.”37 Perhaps if
extant laws were strictly enforced, massive platforms would be cautious about abusing
their power. However, at least in the United States, according to New York University
Professor Scott Galloway, officials are effectively “telling [tech] companies that the smart,
shareholder-friendly thing to do is obvious: Break the law, lie, do whatever it takes, and
then pay a (relatively) anemic fine if you happen to get caught.”38 In Mitchell’s words, the
firms effectively “become the market”; in mine, they become “functional sovereigns.” 39 In
neither case are we dealing with classic interactions within a market—rather, we are facing
an increasingly political economy, where power is exercised by firms, in a legal
environment that firms themselves also shaped.
III. The Political Economy Alternative
Martha McCluskey has brilliantly exposed the shortcomings of mainstream law and
economics in a series of articles. In “Defining the Pie, Not Dividing It,” she takes on one
of the field’s defining moves: an insistence that maximizing gross social output is the
primary role of law, with distributional concerns relegated to later taxation and transfers.
The classical assumption here is that there is a “market” that, ideally, operates unimpeded
by distortions imposed by law.
McCluskey demonstrates that the dominant law and economics paradigm of
temporally sequenced production and distribution is not simply an analytical tool for
clarity, but an ideologically loaded metaphor. It discredits policymakers’ efforts to
improve the workplace or to alleviate externalities before machinery is built or work rules
are set. The idea is to, instead, compensate individuals after the damage has been done,
once authorities can fully assess the scope and intensity of harm. However, some harms
are truly irremediable. All the money in the world cannot restore the cognitive capacity of
Stacy Mitchell, Amazon Doesn’t Just Want to Dominate the Market: It Wants to Become the Market, The
Nation (Feb. 15, 2018) (https://www.thenation.com/article/amazon-doesnt-just-want-to-dominate-themarket-it-wants-to-become-the-market/).
37
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see
also
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someone severely poisoned by lead paint. Moreover, the wealth made by polluters in
“Time 1” (the time of production) is not sequestered into some apolitical bastion of the
purely monetary. Instead, those resources all too often marshalled before or during “Time
2” (the time of political influence over distribution) in order to thwart serious
redistributive efforts.40
There is no simple division between the conditions of production and those of
distribution. Rather, they reciprocally influence one another at all times. Workers with
some financial reserve (or a strike fund) can walk off the job and either take time to find
another one, or wait for their current employer to make concessions. Those without such
support are far more vulnerable. Prior distribution is always influencing the terms of
current production, and vice versa.
McCluskey also shows that the first, temporal simplification of production and
distribution leads to another, even more misleading metaphor—that of society’s
economic output as a pie, to be sliced only after it is baked. The pie metaphor, so
common in standard law and economics frameworks, is truly half-baked: it is a
simplification of the first simplification, and even more biased. McCluskey gives
numerous examples where each metaphor is transparently debunked as inappropriate. She
also shows how specific attention to particular “markets” illuminates the real stakes of
regulation. The unduly capacious term “market” covers a diverse array of politicoeconomic patterns of exchange.41 McCluskey’s article demonstrates that diverse legal
regimes matter just as much to the composition of society’s economic “pie” as to its
distribution.
Sabeel Rahman’s work complements McCluskey’s, showing what can be done
when a more open and holistic approach to social science informs the academic analysis
of corporate power. Rahman debunks another misleading metaphor at the core of
technocratic administration of economic systems—the Hayekian characterization of the
economy as a spontaneously ordered, chaotic system.42 Rahman aims to replace this sense
of the chaotic lack of intention in markets with a more concrete sense of the structures

For an account of a similar tripartite division (albeit with a strikingly different political valence), see Carl
Schmitt, Appropriation, Distribution, Production, in Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the
Jus Publicum Europaeum 324 (G.L. Ulmen trans., 2003) (1950).
40
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Mirowski & Nik-Khah, supra note 20.

There is a deep connection here between Rahman’s critique and those of Ranchordás, Stucke, and
Ezrachi. Rahman questions the fairness of market ordering; Ranchordás, Stucke, and Ezrachi undermine
common narratives about the superiority of algorithmic ranking and rating over human judgment. The New
Chicago School has amended and extended its classic defense of markets by emphasizing the role of big
data and predictive analytics in overcoming consumers’ lack of knowledge and other distortions. However,
it is hard to read the work presented in this issue without sensing that algorithms may become a new way to
rationalize market ordering in the Freudian, as opposed to Weberian, sense. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale,
Algorithms and Markets: The Perfect Excuses, Video Statement for the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (Dec.
3, 2016) (https://youtu.be/HteGOTWRqO8?t=16m34s).
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embedded in legal orders that heavily influence, and sometimes even pre-determine,
economic results (ranging from educational attainment to health disparities and beyond.)
Rahman identifies a fundamental shortcoming in the law and economics tendency
toward technocratically meliorist policy interventions. While it is critically important to
ensure that engines of social mobility are nondiscriminatory and accessible, even the most
meritocratic arrangements to advance opportunity fail to address the unfairness of a world
where, for example, three men (Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, and Jeff Bezos) have more
wealth than 150 million of their fellow U.S. citizens. Neoliberals may work very hard to
ensure that in the future, everyone has an equal shot at such riches.43 However, improving
the chances of all to succeed within a given structure does nothing to ensure a more
egalitarian structure (where, for instance, progressive taxation may keep an individual
from reaching certain heights of wealth).
Rahman makes a compelling argument for reviving the “progressive political
economy” of the early twentieth century to take on the vast power inequalities that
present economic structures enable. Such political economy would limit the power of a
CEO like Bezos to extract money from the transactions on Amazon’s mTurk platform
(where some workers earn as little as a penny from each “human intelligence task” they
perform). 44 It would also curb the profit expectations of real estate developers eager to
gain from bidding wars on prime property. Rahman provides a framework to help
policymakers “respond to new forms of private power in a changing economy,” including
that of powerful internet platforms and financial interests.45
The early twentieth-century Progressive movement did not seek to regulate
utilities simply because large firms may not be efficient. They also worried directly about
the power exercised by such firms: their ability to influence politicians, control an outsized
share of GDP, and sandbag both rival firms and political opponents. As Rahman has
explained in earlier work,
Industries triggered public utility regulation when there was a combination of economies
of scale limiting ordinary accountability through market competition, and a moral or
social importance that made the industries too vital to be left to the whims of the market
or the control of a handful of private actors.46

There are very few “natural” monopolies. Identifying the list of “foundational goods and
services” meriting either antitrust action or direct utility regulation inevitably requires a
mix of political, scientific, and legal considerations on top of economic calculations.47
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As Rahman relates, three broad categories of regulation can provide a “21st
century framework for public utility regulation:”
1) [F]irewalling core necessities away from behaviors and practices that might
contaminate the basic provision of these goods and services—including through
structural limits on the corporate organization and form of firms that provide
infrastructural goods;
2) [I]mposing public obligations on infrastructural firms, whether negative obligations to
prevent discrimination or unfair disparities in prices, or positive obligations to proactively provide equal, affordable, and accessible services to under-served constituencies;
and
3) [C]reating public options, state-chartered, cheaper, basic versions of these services that
would offer an alternative to exploitative private control in markets otherwise immune to
competitive pressures.48

These three approaches (“firewalls,” “public obligations” and “public options”) have all
helped increase the accountability of private power in the past (as Robert Lee Hale’s work
has shown).49 Cable firms cannot charge a customer a higher rate because they dislike her
politics. Nor can they squeeze businesses that they want to purchase, charging higher and
higher rates to an acquisition target until it relents. Nor should regulators look kindly on
holding companies that would more ruthlessly financialize essential services.
There are many legal scholars working in fields like communications law, banking
law, and cyberlaw, who identify the limits of dominant regulatory approaches, but are
researching in isolation. Rahman’s work, as well as that of many other New Brandeisians,
provides a unifying framework for them to learn from one another, and should catalyze
important interdisciplinary work. For example, it is well past time for those writing about
search engines to explore how principles of net neutrality could translate into robust
principles of search neutrality.50 The European Commission has documented Google’s
abuse of its dominant position in shopping services. Subsequent remedial actions should
provide many opportunities for the imposition of public obligations (such as
commitments to display at least some non-Google-owned properties prominently in
contested search engine results pages) and firewalling (which might involve stricter merger
review when a megafirm makes yet another acquisition).51
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Both Rahman and McCluskey offer us a rigorous way of recognizing and
controlling private power.52 This is work that could lead to fundamental reassessments of
contemporary regulatory approaches. It is exactly the type of research that state, federal,
and international authorities should consult as they try to rein in the power of many
massive firms in our increasingly concentrated, winner-take-all economy.53
Conclusion: Signs of Hope?
Economic policy shapes our daily lives, and can be a matter of life and death. Consider,
for instance, the imposition of austerity on many Asian countries in the wake of the 1998
crisis. The once-booming economies of Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia
suddenly collapsed in 1997-1998, when skittish foreign investors sold off massive
amounts of these countries’ currencies.54 Inflation soon followed, and food prices rose,
causing a catastrophe akin the Great Depression in the United States. The International
Monetary Fund offered to help with some forms of credit and aid, but only if its
“beneficiaries” agreed to slash government budget deficits (in order to inspire confidence
from investors).55 The required cuts in government spending hurt national health systems,
and worsened unemployment. The IMF even taxed kerosene (a cooking fuel) in
Indonesia, causing more hardship.
IMF technocrats predicted such “shock therapy” would help more than it hurt.
While Indonesia and Thailand faithfully followed IMF orthodoxy, Malaysia defied the
organization.56 It imposed capital controls, fixed its exchange rate, and maintained
subsidies to support its poorest citizens. Unlike Indonesia and Thailand, Malaysia had “no
significant rise in malnutrition among mothers.” 57 Indonesia and Thailand also had very
troubling disruptions in access to health care, which Malaysia did not experience. 58
Models of “expansionary austerity” predicted that reductions in government
spending and deficits would “crowd in” private investment by reducing interest rates. But
the deceptively simple “common sense” of austerity was probably more important in
media, public forums, and politics. That “common sense” compares a nation in a financial
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crisis to a family that now has to cut back its budget (due to overspending), or to an
overeating person who now “tightens the belt” to avoid excess.
Ha-Joon Chang, as well as authors in the school of Modern Monetary Theory
(MMT), have debunked these homely analogies. 59 Chang’s approach was largely historical.
He found that the same countries which insisted upon austerity for others’ financial crises,
met their own recessions and depressions with stimulative spending and counter-cyclical,
automatic stabilizers (such an unemployment insurance). While American technocrats
eagerly pushed government spending cuts for Southeast Asian countries in the midst of
crisis, America itself embraced spending on public works during its Great Depression (of
the 1930s) and Great Recession (of 2008-2010). For the Modern Monetary Theorists, the
analogy of country to family is simply a category mistake. No individual family issues its
own currency, while most countries do. If a country prints more money to stimulate
spending, it does not necessarily provoke unsustainable inflation. 60 And even if it does
create some inflationary pressures, those can be a welcome counterbalance to the
deflationary tendencies of a depression.
At first, these ideas were dismissed as heresy. But over time, the work of Chang,
MMT theorists, and other heterodox thinkers has begun to have an impact. For example,
the IMF has confessed that the austerity it recommended for Greece had severe negative
consequences.61 Politicians are now more apt to question economic reasoning once
accepted as the inevitable outcome of mathematical principles. Heterodox thinking has
become a significant part of the economic conversation, as discontent with inequality and
disillusionment with technocratic regulation have both been on the rise.
The essays in this issue should help ensure that the turn to new economic thinking
promotes inclusive prosperity. Listokin, Bayern, and Kwak have identified major aporias
in contemporary legal economic orthodoxy. Ranchordás, Stucke, and Ezrachi have
demonstrated that technological fixes, ranging from digital ranking and rating systems to
artificial intelligence-driven personal assistants, are unlikely to improve matters much
unless they are wisely regulated. McCluskey and Rahman offer a blueprint for democratic
Chang repeatedly criticized the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) handling of the Asian financial
crises of the late 1990s. Ha-Joon Chang, Korea: The Misunderstood Crisis, 26 World Dev. 1555 (1998); HaJoon Chang, Bad Samaritans (2009). For a characteristic MMT voice, see L. Randall Wray, Modern Money
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regulation, which shapes the economy in productive ways and alleviates structural
inequalities. Taken as a whole, this issue of Critical Analysis of Law shows that legal thinkers
are not merely importers of ideas and models from economics, but also active
participants, with a great deal to contribute to social science research.

